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1 MÜSİAD  (The  Association  of  Independent  Industrialists  and  Businessmen),  an
Islamically-oriented business association, is a group which must be studied within the
context of both the business associations that constitute an essential element of civil
society and the Islamic movements in Turkey. Yet, whereas most European studies on
Turkish civil society organizations remain limited to the most vocal NGOs represented
in Brussels, the literature on the Islamic movement has remained exclusively focused
on the transformation of Islamist political parties within the EU membership process.
2 At first sight, MÜSİAD seems to have an inconsistent and shifting approach towards
Turkey’s EU membership. Yet, the literature on Turkish business associations informs
us that  MÜSİAD joined the pro-EU alliance after 2003 with a  new discourse on the
compatibility of EU membership as well as the Islamic-democratic character of Turkey
(Atan 2004: 111-112) in order to convince the Turkish state to perceive religious rights
as an extension of democracy and individual rights, while benefiting from EU resources
and trade opportunities within the European market (Öniş & Türem 2001).
3 This article aims to deepen this literature through a systematic analysis of MÜSİAD’s
attitude  towards  EU  integration.  I  study  the  evolution  of  MÜSİAD’s  approach  to
Turkey’s EU membership and related issues in the period of 1994-2008 in close relation
with changing economic relations, domestic political issues, and larger international
phenomena. My objective is to measure MÜSİAD’s Europeanization by studying when
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and how Turkey’s EU integration process produced changes in MÜSİAD’s symbolic and
material resources as well as political preferences and policy narratives.
4 From an actor-centered analysis,  I  argue that  in  MÜSİAD’s  case,  Europeanization is
made  up  of  two  interrelated  aspects.  First,  this  process  produces  two  dynamics:
economic Europeanization as a social learning process and political Europeanization as
political  opportunism and ongoing Euroscepticism. Secondly,  there is  an interesting
shift from hard Euroscepticism based on a civilizational divergence argument towards
a soft Euroscepticism expressed in national-interest and in a new Islamic rhetoric.
5 To elaborate my arguments, this article is organized in two sections. In the first section,
the notion of Europeanization is operationalized as the analytical tool in relation to the
rise of the civil society in Turkey and the change of the Islamic movement’s attitude
towards Turkey’s integration into the EU. I discuss the change in attitude of the Islamic
movement in favor of Turkey’s further Europeanization as political opportunism. Here,
political opportunism is related to political Europeanization in the sense that the EU
integration process produces opportunity windows affecting the material and symbolic
resources available to political actors such as political parties, parliaments, and interest
groups.  Then,  I  observe  the  economic  Europeanization  of  MÜSİAD  as  a  process  of
societal Europeanization at both the individual and organizational levels. By economic
Europeanization,  I  mean  the  process  of  social  learning  about  European  business
patterns  and culture  in  the  sense  of  formal  and informal  norms as  well  as  macro-
economic  governance.  MÜSİAD  businessmen’s  ways  and  degree  of  integration  into
European business spaces and their evaluation of European business patterns provide a
valuable  indicator  of  the  degree  of  their  economic  Europeanization.  This  section is
based on the interviews realized with MÜSİAD members during my PhD dissertation
fieldwork in February, August and September 20071.
6 The  second  section  describes  the  political  Europeanization  trajectory  of  MÜSİAD,
relying  on  a  systematic  analysis  of  published  reports,  public  declarations  and  its
leaders’ press statements in the period 1994-2008 in order to discern the way Europe
and EU-related issues are treated and the way these are utilized as a prism to interpret
public  issues.  After  dealing  in  the  first  part  with  the  relation  between  political
opportunism and political Europeanization, in this section I focus on Europeanization’s
impact on political rhetoric mobilized by the association concerning EU-related issues
as well as other national political debates within the integration process. The notion of
Euroscepticism  is  provided  as  an  analytical  tool  to  measure  the  quality  and  the
direction of the rhetorical change.
 
I. From Political Opportunism to Economic
Europeanization of MÜSİAD
7 The 1999 Helsinki Summit was ‘the’ turning point in Turkey-EU relations due to the
clear commitment from both the EU and the Turkish government that resolved the
anchor-credibility  dilemma that  had ambiguously  marked Turkey’s  Europeanization
history (Uğur 2003). The credible commitment not only let the pro-EU actors to become
more vocal and active but also made the constituents against EU membership to find it
increasingly  difficult  to  equate  their objections  to  reforms  with  the  defense  of  an
overarching national interest. Furthermore, the resolution of this dilemma led those
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who  were  undecided  or  mildly  Eurosceptical  to  support  EU  membership  (Uğur  &
Yankaya 2008: 8-9).
 
EU integration and the rise of civil society
8 Europeanization stands for a process of something – individuals, processes, practices,
or  peoples-  becoming  European (Beichelt  2008:  31).  In  the  academic  literature,  the
concept of Europeanization is primarily operationalized as the institution-building and
policy-making process of European integration. Then, it is seen as a top-down process,
concentrating on the domestic impacts of European integration on governmental and
non-governmental  institutions,  politics  and  policies  in  member  and  candidate
countries.  In this  study,  I  adopt Radaelli’s  (2004)  approach that  significantly differs
from these two approaches by picturing Europeanization as a dynamic and interactive
process.  Radaelli  (2004:  4)  uses  a  bottom-up  model  that  starts  and  finishes  at  the
domestic  level  and  in  which  Europeanization  is  problematized  as  a  process  that
produces  change.  This  approach  seeks  to  understand  if,  when,  and  how  the  EU
contributes to a change in actors,  problems,  resources,  styles and discourses at  the
domestic level by using time and temporal causal sequences.
9 Europeanization includes alterations in the domestic opportunity structures that lead
to a redistribution of resources and constraints for domestic political actors (Börzel &
Risse 2000: 4). The rationalist-institutionalist perspective suggests that the more the
new  opportunities  and  constraints  Europeanization  produces,  the  more  likely  a
redistribution of resources will be, which may alter the domestic balance of power by
empowering  domestic  actors  to  effectively  initiate  policy  change  by  overriding
domestic veto points (Börzel & Risse 2000: 10; Wilts 2002: 98).
10 The pre-accession democratic conditionality helps to open up what may previously be a
very limited space for civil society organizations and their operations (Weber 2006: 91).
In Turkey, civil society associations have been the principal actors in the influential
pro-EU coalition that emerged in the post-Helsinki period (Öniş 2003: 29). Indeed, the
opening  in  the  political  opportunity  structure  was  accompanied  by  a  furthering  of
dialogue between state officials, government, and civil society organizations in Turkey.
Hence, I agree with Tocci (2005: 80-81) that these have been both subjects and objects in
the  reform  process  at  the  same  time  as  being  gradually  empowered  by  it  and  by
pushing for further EU integration. The literature demonstrates that the activation of
civil society towards democratization of domestic polity has legitimized its existence
through  political  Europeanization  and  played  a  major  role  for  further  integration
through their agency in societal Europeanization.
11 Turkish  business  associations,  despite  the  differences  in  their  attitudes  towards
Turkey’s  European  integration  before  1999,  proved  to  be  among  the  most  active
pressure  groups  for  Turkey’s  Europeanization.  TÜSIAD  (Turkish  Industrialists’  and
Businessmen’s  Association)  and  the  İKV  (Economic  Development  Foundation)  have
been  the  pioneering  business  associations  actively  committed  to  the  prospect  of
Turkey’s  membership since the 1990s.  TOBB (Union of  the Chambers of  Commerce,
Industry, Maritime Trade and Stock Exchanges of Turkey) and TİSK (Confederation of
the Employers’  Unions of Turkey),  having passively followed the process until  1999,
joined the pro-EU business alliance after the Helsinki Summit decision. These business
associations  not  only  serve  as  agents  of  lobbying  for  further  political  and  policy
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Europeanization  but  also  as  agents  of  societal  Europeanization  through  their
membership in European business networks such as BUSINESSEUROPE2 and through
their  representational  and lobbying  activities  in  EU institutions  via  their  offices  in
Brussels (see Visier & Polo 2005).
 
Europeanization and the political opportunism of Islamic groups
12 MÜSİAD is an Islamically-oriented organization (on this see Buğra 1998,  1999,  2002;
Çınar 2005; Öniş  1997; Keyman & Koyuncu 2004; Kıvanç 1997). It emphasizes Islamic
ethics in economy and the importance of religiosity in society and the individual’s life3.
With its institutional public identity and the religiously conservative social group of the
small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) that it represents, MÜSİAD is situated at the
intersection of spheres of business associations and Islamic movements.
13 The Islamic movement, in terms of its political and societal agents, became both the
subject and object of Turkey’s Europeanization. It is a fact that the 1990s created some
socio-economic  transformations  that  led  the  Islamic  groups  to  support  Turkey’s
European orientation. One of the determinant elements of this change was the military
intervention  of  February  28th 1997  that  aimed  to  exclude  all  Islamic  groups  from
economic, social and political spheres, seeing them as part of a reactionary threat to
the  secular  regime.  Other  than  the  Islamist  Welfare  Party’s  closure,  MÜSİAD
experienced this period as a stigma, due to its supposedly close relations with political
Islam, both at the associational and individual levels,  especially for the larger-sized
enterprise members. These became the object of special investigations by the military
and of heavy sanctions from the state, as they were accused of financing political Islam.
Its membership dropped from 2900 to 2300 (Öniş 2001: 290).4
14 The EU membership conditionality5, with its emphasis on the establishment of civilian
control over the military, promised to MÜSİAD and other Islamic groups a window of
opportunity to enhance their economic and political position vis-à-vis the military by
curtailing the latter’s influence on political and public spheres. This brought a radical
change in  these  groups’  positions  vis-à-vis  the EU with the declaration of  Turkey’s
official candidacy for full membership in 1999 Helsinki Summit.
15 The strong commitment of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to harmonization
reforms and EU membership from 2001-2004 was an unanticipated commitment since
its leader, Mr Erdoğan, had labeled the EU as a ‘Christian club’ in 1992 when he was the
mayor of Istanbul. The AKP distanced itself not only from other parties with an EU-
skeptical  approach,  but  also  from its  predecessors,  who subscribed  to  the  National
Outlook  Movement  that  had  historically  represented  the  major  categorical  Islamist
opposition to Turkey’s EU membership since the 1970s (Uğur & Yankaya 2008 : 592).
16 Europeanization empowers some actors while restricting the powers of others (Diez et
al.  2005:  10).  Some  actors  become  winners  in  the  Europeanization  process  because
pressures  generated  by  European  integration  are  congruent  with  their  existing
strategies, notably by providing a source of legitimacy for the changes that they desire
for non-EU reasons (Thatcher 2004: 284). Furthermore, Europeanization may enhance
the  ability  of  some  actors  to  delegitimize  the  positions  of  others,  notably  their
opponents, while legitimizing their own policy positions (Haverland 2000: 140). In such
cases, EU requirements are not perceived as a conditionality pressure but rather as a
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window  of  opportunity  for  those  who  are  already  seeking  reform  for  their  own
interests.
17 In  fact,  the  AKP’s  adoption  of  EU political  criteria  in  the  form of  ‘Ankara  criteria’
stemmed from its perception that the prospect of membership could be an opportunity
to broaden the political, economic and cultural opportunity spaces that were shrunk
during  the  February  28th  process.  In  the  context  of  competition  between  Islamic
groups  and  the  military  over  identity  religious  issues,  the  EU’s  pre-accession
democratic  conditionalities  promised  the  strengthening  and  legitimizing  Islamic
groups’ positions and demands at the expense of the latter.
18 Especially after 2000, Islamic groups became the winners in the process by increasingly
adhering to the prospect of EU membership. MÜSİAD started to eagerly advocate the
adoption  of  universal  norms  of  democracy  in  the  framework  of  legislative
harmonization with the EU. The democratization reforms were re-interpreted not as an
external interference in Turkey’s domestic affairs but rather as a continuation of the
democratization discussions about the necessary political, bureaucratic and economic
progress that had been going on for twenty years (MÜSİAD 2001: 39) and given extra
urgency by the political, social and psychological turmoil generated in 1997 (MÜSİAD
2002: 56-57). The credibility of the EU’s encouraging statements at the 2000, 2001, and
2002 summits, the EU Commission Reports’ emphasis on the establishment of civilian
control over the military (EU Commission 2000: 14; 2001: 19; 2002: 16), the effects of
liberalization  measures  on  the  functioning  of  civil  society  organizations  (MÜSİAD
2003d:  86-87),  the  AKP  governments’  strong  Europeanization  commitment,  and  the
explicitly  pro-European  public  opinion  all  encouraged  MÜSİAD  to  recognize  the
opportunities  provided by Europeanization and to  favor  further  Europeanization in
turn.
19 Turkey’s Europeanization process led MÜSİAD to become more politicized in the sense
of being politically more expressive about important domestic political issues on which
it had heretofore been silent. The change in MÜSİAD toward a pro-European approach
exemplified  a  political  opportunism  which  appears  in  one  of  its  founders’  words:
‘MÜSİAD  follows  the  government’s  discourse.  It  says  neither  ‘no’  nor  ‘yes’  to
Europeanization…  If  MÜSİAD  had  maintained  its  anti-EU  position,  it  would  be  left
outside  of  all  related  discussions’  (Interview  with  a  founder,  Istanbul,  28.02.2007).
Hence,  behind  the  change  in  MÜSİAD  attitude  towards  supporting  the  accession
process are both pragmatic and opportunistic reasons. In this process of politicization,
the association’s close ties with the AKP were also operative in the sense that MÜSİAD’s
visibility  in  the  public  sphere  had  considerably  increased  through  greater  media
coverage and the presence of MÜSİAD members in the parliament as well as in the
AKP’s local organizations and local chambers of commerce and industries after 2002.
Along with the AKP, MÜSİAD became both the object and the subject of the European
integration process and became involved in the Europeanization of politics in Turkey.
20 The new political structure offering an opportunity to local actors to legitimize their
policy positions required these to be discussed within the Europeanization framework.
Social  actors  re-evaluate  and  redefine  their  own  identities,  political  positions  and
preferences within the new dynamics of a domestic political context provided by the
EU integration process. This dimension calls for a more profound Europeanization than
the one at the political level because it involves the creative usage of the interactive
process of EU integration by the domestic social actors. The term ‘usage’ covers the
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practices and political interactions that are adjusted and redefined by approaching the
EU  as  a  set  of  opportunities,  be  they  institutional,  ideological,  political  or
organizational (Jacquot & Woll 2003: 3-4).
21 In the case of Islamic actors in Turkey, the Europeanization process resulted in the
reformulation of  religion-related political  and social  demands into democratization-
based  discourses  of  human  rights,  rule  of  law  and  multiculturalism  (Duran  2006:
295-297) based on the cross-fertilization of Islamic and European ideas and practices
(Yavuz 2006: 256) hoping to persuade both EU and secular Turkish public opinion about
the legitimacy of the desire to increase religious freedoms. The creative usages concern
the  way  the  self-definitions  of  social  identities  evolve  through  the  process  of
Europeanization.  Thereby,  Europeanization’s  effects  do  not  remain  limited  to  the
discursive or political dimensions of the Islamic groups’ social positioning, but rather,
this process results in an alignment between their patterns of thought and action and
European norms and practices.
22 At the end of the day,  Islamic groups found themselves drawn into this interactive
Europeanization process through learning to take the EU/Europe not only as a mere
political  opportunity  provider  but  also  as  a  normative  reference  point  for  the  re-
evaluation  and  re-definition  of  individual  and  collective  identities.  MÜSİAD,  as  a
professional association of businessmen, provides a suggestive case to demonstrate that
Europeanization engenders a process of questioning previously accepted patterns of
doing business and economic self-evaluation as well as an effort to coordinate with the
newly  experienced  European  business  norms  and  patterns.  This  process  of  social
learning experienced by MÜSİAD in the European economic sphere will be dealt in the
next part.
 
Economic Europeanization of MÜSİAD
23 Following  Radaelli’s  bottom-up  model  perspective,  in  this  article,  the  notion  of
Europeanization  is  conceived  as  an  interactive  process  of  reinterpreting  policy
preferences and policy framing styles at both the national and international levels by a
social actor capitalizing on the material,  political and symbolic sources provided by
European integration. Hence the various dimensions of the process are not taken as
mutually independent, but rather as various aspects that are expected to accompany
each  other,  even  if  at  different  rates  and  in  different  sequences.  It  is  the  process
through which Europe becomes a common reference point increasingly referred to in
domestic  debates,  as  well  as  the  alignment  of  policies,  political  processes  or  social
identities with those within Europe (Diez et al. 2005: 2).
24 MÜSİAD is the major Islamically-oriented businessmen association in Turkey. Founded
in May 1990, it represents SMEs at the national level. The member-firms operate in
each  and  every  sector  in  the  economy;  in  total,  they  produce  15% of  the  national
revenue  and  employ  more  than  80,000  people.  Moreover,  they  also  operate  in  the
international market, their major import and export areas cover Europe, Central Asia,
the Middle East and North Africa. As an interest group, its strength stems from the
breadth of its social base: the headquarters being in Istanbul, the association organizes
more than 2,700 firms through its national structure of local branches all over Anatolia.
25 The  fact  that  MÜSİAD  is  a  businessmen’s  association  primarily  committed  to  its
members’ economic interests led it to recognize the necessity of Turkey’s economic
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compliance  with  the  European  economic  system  earlier  than  other  Islamic
organizations.  Since  the  economic  liberalization  started  in  the  1980s  when  Turkey
switched from import substitution industrialization to an export-oriented economy,
the  Turkish  SME  sector  has  had  growing  trade  relations  with  foreign  markets,
including Europe. In line with this trend, a significant number of MÜSİAD members
have developed trade relations with European countries.  Germany,  Greece,  Holland,
Italy and the Balkan countries are among the first countries that these entrepreneurs
have been doing business with especially since the second half of the 1990s. Some of the
main exports to Europe are construction and building supplies, household appliances
and  furnishings,  plastic  packaging  materials,  food  products  and,  increasingly,
mechanical goods. In return, high technology machinery and construction equipment
that are not produced in Turkey are imported from Europe.
26 Trade constitutes the principal means for these businessmen to get into close contact
with European businessmen, business spaces and European business culture. The major
ways that they acquire familiarity is  through their  European business partners and
their participation in international fairs organized in European countries. Every year,
MÜSİAD opens stands for its members in international expos such as the International
Furnishing Show and the Anuga food and beverage fair in Cologne, Technologica in
Hanover, the Automotive Subcontractor fair in Paris and Frankfurt, and the Texbridge
textile expo in Milan. The association also plays a key role in the economic socialization
of  its  members  into  the  European  markets  through  the  visits  that  it  organizes  to
various EU countries, as well as through its representational offices in EU countries
that help to create an international business network at its members’ service. MÜSİAD
businessmen  enlarge  their  trade  area  by  sub-contracts  and  distributorships  with
various European manufacturers in Turkey, especially in high technology machinery
and the automobile industry.
27 Furthermore, family ties often connect Turkish businessmen to Europe, especially in
countries with important Turkish immigrant communities such as Germany, Holland
and  Kosovo.  This  grants  them  access  to  trade  opportunities  and  hence  becomes  a
source  of  socialization  within  the  European  business  community.  For  instance,  a
doctor/administrator  of  a  hospital  in  Konya  having  parents  in  Holland  established
contracts  with  the  social  security  institutions  of  EU countries.  This  partnership  let
Turkish immigrants receive health services in that hospital in Konya with the same
opportunities granted by the social security scheme in their host countries. In the same
framework, some Turkish businesses have also tried to attract foreign customers to
Turkey for health tourism. Consequently, the attempt to attract European customers
leads to the pioneering adoption of European business practices, providing European-
style customer services and public relations.
28 Since  1999,  with  the  prospect  of  EU  membership,  MÜSİAD  businessmen  have
increasingly  followed  the  trend  of  acquiring  the  CE  mark  [Certificat  de  conformité
européenne] proving that the product complies with EU health and safety requirements.
According  to  the  Additional  Protocol  signed  in  2004,  all  Turkish  products  to  be
exported to EU market should carry the CE mark. This regulation leads businessmen to
adapt the quality of the raw material they use and their manufacturing systems to the
EU’s  economic  norms  and  business  standards.  As  a  result  of  the  economic
harmonization  process,  European  business  norms  and  quality  standards  have  been
thoroughly  integrated  into  the  way  businessmen  evaluate  the  functioning  of  the
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Turkish domestic  market.  MÜSİAD members that produce for EU markets complain
about the unfair business competition in Turkey that is created by the cheaper prices
offered by enterprises that lack the CE mark and which have lower quality standards.
29 MÜSİAD businessmen observe European economic practices and business culture when
they visit these countries and trade with European counterparts, learning in order to
increase  their  competitiveness  with  regard  to  them.  Beside  the  European  market,
which is the main demanded trade partner, the Balkans, the Middle East, and Central
Asian countries are also highly invested in by MÜSİAD businessmen. Their multiple
experiences  let  them  compare  and  contrast  the  functioning  of  economic  life  in
European countries with that in non-European ones.
30 My fieldwork demonstrates that European economic governance and business culture
form the normative reference points for these businessmen’s concepts and standards of
entrepreneurial  identity  and  economic  practices.  They  consider  the  European
economic culture to be superior to that of non-European ones as well as the economic
culture  and  practices  in  Turkey.  When  doing  business,  they  prefer  European
enterprises  over  the  non-European  ones  because  of  clear  economic  functioning
mechanisms  in  European  countries  and  personal  business  ethics  of  European
businessmen.  Precise  working  hours  for  employees  and  employers,  high  levels  of
professionalization,  precise  work  definitions,  the  clear  division  of  labor,  work
discipline, the importance given to concrete knowledge and science, as well as clear
checking mechanisms are the main elements that MÜSİAD businessmen value about
the  European  business  culture.  The  transparency  of  commercial  and  financial
transactions is also appreciated as a model of European business ethics. The division
between work and private life as practiced in Europe is another aspect of European
business culture praised by my interviewees who, generally, work six days a week and
complain of not being able to enjoy the high living standards that their careers should
provide for them.
31 MÜSİAD functions as  a spillover  agent  for  the Europeanization of  the Turkish SME
sector at the organizational and technical levels as well. It advocates the espousal of
EU-defined  SME  structures  in  Turkey  in  order  to  facilitate  EU  institutions’  and
international  banks’  lending  practices  for  Turkish  SME  sector’s  development.
Furthermore, the association provides information services to its members about new
EU regulations, the status of the EU accession process, as well as EU funding projects. It
also encourages them to be open to the European market and to integrate into the EU
business world. For instance, in Konya, a central Anatolian province with the highest
rate of MÜSİAD membership in Anatolia, sixteen member-firms obtained EU funding in
2006 with the help of  a  business  consultancy firm that  is  itself  a  MÜSİAD member
(interview with a member, Konya, 28.08.2007). The association itself also benefits from
EU  funding  for  NGOs:  it  has  been  conducting  an  EU-financed  project  involving
hydraulic technicians since 2005.
32 MÜSİAD has been a member of the European Confederation of Associations of Small
and Medium-Sized Enterprises (CEA-PME) since 2003 and it envisages opening an office
in Brussels both to monitor the evolution of the negotiation process and to help its
members to further their trade relations with European business circles. With respect
to the association’s professional orientation to Europe, the election of Ömer Bolat to
the  presidency  in  2004  is  quite  revealing.  Bolat  belongs  to  the  first  generation  of
Turkish experts on European business and has graduate degrees from the University of
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Amsterdam and the  University  of  Kiel.  He  was  the  first  academically  accomplished
president  of  the  Association,  and  the  first  president  with  expertise  on  the  EU’s
economic issues.
33 In  the  economic  sphere,  the  Europeanization  of  MÜSİAD  involves  a  high  level  of
socialization  and  learning  that  leads  the  association  to  more  eagerly  advocate  the
economic  integration  of  Turkey  into  the  EU  through  the  adoption  of  European
economic norms and culture. Yet this economic Europeanization is not echoed by an
equivalently strong and explicit promotion of political integration due to reservations
about accession conditionalities involving issues of national interests and religion. The
next section studies the association’s ongoing yet transforming Euroscepticism about
such issues.
 
II. From Hard Euroscepticism to Soft Islamic
Euroscepticism
34 Studying political Europeanization of a civil society actor requires an actor-centered
analysis  to  understand  its  changing  roles  in  the  public  sphere  and  transforming
attitudes vis-à-vis the major public debates. Therefore, this section focuses on MÜSİAD
as a social agent in the national public sphere and analyses the evolution of MÜSİAD’s
approach and discourse with regard to the process of Turkey’s integration with the EU
at  the  associational  level.  Even  though  there  are  internal  divisions  about  Turkey’s
membership  prospect,  as  I  will  later  discuss,  in  the  national  public  sphere  the
association acts as a representative agency with one voice. Hence, publications, reports,
and leaders’ press statements provide us with a relevant and reliable set of information
about the attitude of the social group that the association claims to represent towards
major political and public debates in the country, including the EU-related issues.
35 I will study MÜSİAD’s EU attitudes within sub-periods to be able to see the interaction
between  the  micro-level  Europeanization  of  the  association  and  the  macro-level
Europeanization path of Turkey along with larger international phenomena between
1994 and 2008. The 1994-1999 period is marked by a hard Euroscepticism; then between
2000 and 2004,  MÜSİAD adopted an increasingly  pro-EU attitude accompanied by a
national-interest based soft Euroscepticism; and from 2005 onwards an Islamic rhetoric
imposes  itself,  in  addition  to  the  existing  national-interest  one,  to  express  its
Euroscepticism.
 
1994-1999: Islamist Hard Euroscepticism
36 Taggart (1998: 366) describes Euroscepticism as the expression of opposition, to the
process  of  European  integration,  whether  contingent  or  qualified  opposition,  or
outright and unqualified opposition. Yet, since the degree of opposition and the issues
stressed as reasons for the opposition are context- and actor-dependent, Taggart and
Szczerbiak (2001) differentiate between different forms of Euroscepticism such as hard
and soft Euroscepticism.
37 Hard Euroscepticism implies an outright rejection of the entire project of European
political  and  economic  integration  and  opposition  to  their  country  joining  or
remaining a member of the EU. Theoretically, it includes a principled objection to the
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idea of any European economic or political integration. The principled objection comes
from the belief  that the EU is  counter to deeply held values or,  more likely,  is  the
embodiment  of  negative  values  (Taggart  &  Szczerbiak  2001:  10).  This  kind  of
Euroscepticism is seen in parties who think that their countries should withdraw from
membership (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2002: 7) or candidacy.
38 In that sense, MÜSİAD’s 1994-1999 EU attitude is characterized by hard Euroscepticism.
This  categorical  objection to European integration was expressed in relation to the
civilizational divergences between Turkey and Europe in an antinomy between ‘us and
them’.  The  first  mentioning  of  the EU by  MÜSİAD was  from the  perspective  of  an
international Muslim community,  as one of the international power blocks that the
Muslim world should take into consideration to establish a new world perspective for
the 21st century (Yarar 1994:  1).  Since Turkey was a Muslim country,  not only was
Turkey’s membership not even mentioned as a future possibility but also Yarar, the
then-president  of  the  Association,  recommended  the  extension  of  Turkey’s  trade
relations towards Eastern Asia basing on cultural convergence rather than Europe. The
EU was perceived as a part, with USA and Israel, of the triangle that harms Turkey on
political, economic, and cultural terms (MÜSİAD 1996a: 7).
39 After the coming into effect of the Customs Union (CU) in 1996, MÜSİAD stiffened its
anti-EU attitude and posted a clear objection to both the CU and EU membership while
TÜSİAD  eagerly  embraced  it  as  a  step  forward  towards  full  membership.  MÜSİAD,
similar to the Welfare Party that was part of the governing coalition in 1996, expressed
concerns about the CU’s detrimental effects on Turkey’s strategic interests. The main
reason behind the divergence of attitudes of MÜSİAD and TÜSİAD regarding the CU was
that the largest Turkish enterprises that the latter represented had already attained
some  capital  maturity  and  international  competitiveness  whereas  the  SMEs  that
MÜSİAD represented lacked any such international competitive power.
40 Instead, the Association proposed a Cotton Union in the form an alternative economic
cooperation on cotton production and industry first  with Pakistan,  Uzbekistan,  and
Turkmenistan,  and  then  a  deeper  integration  with  ‘all  other  Turkic  and  Muslim
countries  from  Balkans  to  East  Asia  upon  eternal  religious  and  national  relations’
(MÜSİAD 1996b:  4).  Economically  more  preferable  for  MÜSİAD’s  SME members  and
culturally easier to legitimize through appeals to Muslim fraternity,  this alternative
was likewise supported by the Welfare Party. The project claimed that Turkey would
not  benefit  from  the  economic  and  political  opportunities  of  European  integration
because  of  its  dependent  economic  and  backward  technological  structures.  The
backwardness  argument  was  coupled  with  a  civilizational  incompatibility  discourse
claiming  that  ‘Turkey  is  in  full  contradiction  with  the  EU  member  countries  in
historical, religious and cultural terms.’ (MÜSİAD 1996b: 121).
 
2000-2004: National Interest Euroscepticism
41 The  first  impact  of  Europeanization  on  MÜSİAD’s  political  stance  came  with  the
declaration  of  Turkey’s  official  candidacy  at  the  1999  Helsinki  Summit.  MÜSİAD’s
categorical opposition to Turkey’s EU membership gave way to a compartmentalized
approach underscoring EU integration’s impacts on public issues from a wider political
perspective.  Taggard and Szczerbiak conceptualize this conditional approach as soft
Euroscepticism which is  not  a  principled objection to the European integration but
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where concerns on certain policy areas lead to a qualified opposition to the EU (Taggart
&  Szczerbiak  2002:  7).  Soft  Euroscepticism  can  be  sub-divided  into  policy
Euroscepticism  and  national-interest  Euroscepticism  and  imply  that if  there  were
alterations to either policy area or a shift in national interest, European integration in
its current form could be supported or even encouraged.
42 In Turkey, Euroscepticism is primarily expressed in nationalist/patriotic rhetoric with
the aim of defending national interests while integrating with the EU. Euroscepticism
in Turkey highlights as risky areas the issues of minority rights and the Aegean and
Cyprus issues on which important accession conditionalities were imposed requiring
certain concessions from Turkey (Çarkoğlu 2003: 181).
43 From  2000  onwards,  MÜSİAD  has  refined  its  attitude  vis-à-vis  Turkey’s  European
integration and related issues, moving towards a conditional support for EU integration
depending on the opportunities created by Turkey’s candidate status and those policy
areas  imposed  as  accession  conditionalities  but  including  certain  risks  for  national
interests.  From  a  pro-EU  approach,  the  association  defended  EU  candidacy  on  the
grounds that  it  strengthens Turkey’s  image in the international  area,  increases the
possibility of an increase in foreign direct investments, and that the compliance with
Copenhagen criteria conditionality would accelerate the restructuring of the Turkish
economy and comprehensive social and political reforms concerning democratization,
rule of law and human rights and liberties. However, from a national interest rhetoric,
MÜSİAD judged the conditions imposed on issues of ‘Cyprus and Aegean Sea, and the
capital  punishment of  terrorist  organization’s  leader Apo6,  too risky and heavy’  for
national interests (MÜSİAD 2000: 42).
44 This national interest rhetoric stems from the social group the association represents.
MÜSİAD members  can be  categorized into  two non-mutually  exclusive  groups  with
regard to their attitudes towards Turkey’s European integration. The first category is
composed of Eurosceptics about EU’s credibility to integrate Turkey as a full-fledged
member. There are two reasons, both stemming from what may be called a nationalist
reaction, behind this strong skepticism. The first one is related to a not well argued but
rather taken for granted belief  in European anti-Turkish behavior,  perceived in the
reaction against the acceptance of countries like Bulgaria and Romania into the EU
while leaving Turkey outside. The second one is related to the circulation problems
that the businessmen have on their professional trips into the EU countries. The visa
problems, long waiting hours, and the ‘uncivilized’ treatment by the customs officers of
EU countries are the concrete basis of Euroscepticism at the individual level.
45 The second category is made of pragmatists who favor the Europeanization process
itself  without  putting much emphasis  on the eventuality  of  membership.  The main
advantages of the Europeanization process are cited as increasing the autonomy of the
economic  sphere  from  state  intervention  and  economic  governance  from  political
instabilities.  Furthermore, democratization and the rule of law are cited among the
major accomplishments of the accession process. However, the eventual membership is
considered as a realistic option neither by Eurosceptics nor by pragmatists. Yet, both
Eurosceptics and pragmatists confirm that the membership process should continue to
proceed for mentioned economic and political reasons.
46 Between 2001  and  2004,  MÜSİAD developed  its  most  eager  pro-EU attitudes  in  the
public and economic spheres in the sense of distancing itself  from national-interest
Euroscepticism. We already mentioned that MÜSİAD integrated into the European SME
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network  of  CEA-PME  in  2003  and  favored  further  Europeanization  of  the  Turkish
economy. The association became more expressive about the positive sides of European
integration.  Like  the  AKP,  MÜSİAD  further  distanced  itself  from  the  Eurosceptic
nationalist  alliance  by  stating  that  democratization  measures should  be  taken
regardless  of  the  arguments  about  ‘Turkey’s  special  conditions’  that  highlight
problematic national interest issues such as Cyprus and minorities (MÜSİAD 2001: 39;
MÜSİAD  2002:  57).  This  occurred  to  such  an  extent  that  Ali  Bayramoğlu,  who  was
president of the association at the time, suggested an alteration in the definition of
national  interests  relating  to  the  Cyprus  issue  and  urged  replacing  conflict  with
cooperation in dealing with the European Council’s attitude and the ECHR’s decision7.
His goal was to preclude getting bogged down in these issues and risking good relations
with the EU (MÜSİAD 2003a).
47 MÜSİAD developed a new approach to making use of Turkey’s European integration
process within its foreign policy preferences. In a new formulation, integration within
the  EU  was  considered  as  the  integral  element  of  the  national  foreign  policy
orientation; the main element that will strengthen Turkey’s position with respect to
her economic relations with neighboring countries (MÜSİAD 2001: 39; MÜSİAD 2002: 57;
Bayramoglu 2003: 1; MÜSİAD 2003c: 78). This ambitious pro-European attitude led it to
criticize  the  AKP  government  for  not  sufficiently  taking  advantage  of  the
parliamentary decision which forbade the passage of American troops through Turkish
territory for the war in Iraq in order to strengthen the alliance with the EU in general
(MÜSİAD 2003b) and particularly with the two key EU members, France and Germany,
which opposed the invasion (Bayramoglu 2003: 1). The new multi-dimensional foreign
policy formulation allowed the association to be political  by both circumventing an
overtly  Eurosceptic  attitude  and  legitimizing  the  EU  conditionality  from  within  a
patriotic discourse.
48 However, MÜSİAD became somewhat bogged down by its overtly eager pro-EU attitude
from the end of 2004 onwards. The Commission’s 2004 decision to launch the accession
negotiation was highly conditional and hence problematic for the sustainability of all
domestic actors’ pro-EU positions. It was worded in such a way as to leave open the
possibility  of  a  non-membership  or  of  a  special  partnership  instead  of  full
membership8. Moreover, serious constraints and restrictions were mentioned, such as
‘long transitional periods, derogations, specific arrangements or permanent safeguard
clauses’  concerning  structural  and  agricultural  funds  and  the  free  movement  of
persons. These issues are among the main reasons for Euroscepticism at the individual
level for many MÜSİAD members.
49 After  the  launch  of  negotiations  under  such  mixed  signals,  MÜSİAD  lessened  its
eagerness  in  its  pro-EU  attitude  and  remobilized  national  interest  Euroscepticism
rhetoric (AB Haber 2005). In line with the individual members’ Eurosceptic claims, the
association  declared  the  EU as  having  a  ‘Turkish  problem’  (MÜSİAD 2005).  The  EU
policies were criticized for putting permanent safeguards on the free circulation of
labor and the structural and agricultural funds (MÜSİAD 2005: 97), and about the visa
problems  for  Turkish  citizens  and  trucks  in  European  borders  despite  the  free
circulation rights given in the legal framework of the Ankara Treaty and the Additional
Protocol (MÜSİAD 2006; MÜSİAD 2007b).
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2005-2008: New Islamic Euroscepticism
50 From 2005 on a new Islamic rhetoric was mobilized by MÜSİAD accompanying,  but
differing from,  the national-interest  rhetoric  expressing skepticism about  European
integration’s effects on Islam-related issues in Turkey, in Europe, and in the world. This
can be considered as an unexpected attitude from MÜSİAD that has been giving low
profile in religion related issues, especially since 1997 But, this novelty in MÜSİAD’s EU
attitude has to do with the new international context produced after the 9/11 attacks
that  divided  the  world  between  the  West  and  Islam  and  the  reconciliation  efforts
initiated by Spanish Prime Minister Mr. J. L. Zapatero9 and co-sponsored by Recep Tayy
ıp Erdoğan to establish an Alliance of Civilizations (AoC) between the Western and the
Arab and Muslim worlds.
51 Since the tragic events of 9/11, the EU had been making some efforts to play an active
intermediary  role  between  Western  and  Muslim  countries10.  Yet,  the  AoC  as  a
worldwide initiative co-sponsored by one EU member and one EU candidate country
was  especially  acclaimed  by  both  Turkish  and  other  political  leaders  supporting
Turkey’s  membership.  It  was  argued that  Turkey’s  integration  into  the  EU  could
function  as a  counterargument  against  the  “Clash  of  Civilizations”  thesis.
Notwithstanding, the AoC discourse defined civilizations primarily in religious terms,
highlighted the importance of Turkey’s membership referring to her Islamic character,
and as such excessively underscored the Islamic identity of Turkey as a leading country
of the Islamic civilization (for a discussion on the issue see Kösebalaban 2006; Turan &
Adak 2007). This last point created opportunities for Islamic organizations in Turkey to
politicize  religious  demands  within  further  Europeanization  with  respect  to  the
democratization  conditionalities  in  Turkey  as  well  as  in  a  larger  perspective  of
interaction between the West and Islam: claiming a non-secular Islamic identity was no
longer incompatible with pro-EU approaches.
52 MÜSİAD had already seized the opportunity created by 9/11 with regards to Turkey’s
freshly constructed position as a symbol country of dialogue between West and East.
Ömer Bolat, the president at the time, interpreted the new dynamics that ‘before the
events of 9/11, our being Muslim was the primary obstacle to becoming an EU member,
in  the  new context  it  turned into  an  advantage  for  our  membership’  (Bolat’s  2004
speech in Bolat 2007: 23). MÜSİAD adjusted its political discourse to the developments
and started to promote Turkey’s ‘EU membership … as a new and original structure
that would favor the dialogue between Islamic countries and Western ones and that
would serve to promote world peace.’ (MÜSİAD 2005: 95). With this new perspective,
the  civilizational  divergence  argument  of  the  90s  that  was  the  main  reason  for
MÜSİAD’s anti-EU attitude became one of the primary elements of its pro-EU approach.
53 Even though the AoC discourse  strengthened MÜSİAD’s  pro-EU political  attitude,  it
negatively impacted its  eagerness about the adoption of  universal  secular norms of
democracy and human rights. It revealed skepticism about the universality of European
norms formulated in the EU acquis on the grounds that the EU and Turkey had very
different  cultural  legacies:  ‘The  supposedly  supranational  values  are  neither
unquestionable nor untouchable. MÜSİAD would adopt a critical approach about the
rationality and correctness of these values to see whether they take into consideration
or  not  the  sensibilities  of  people  coming  from  different  cultures,  having  different
values and whether these values produce equal and just consequences for all peoples or
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not.’ (MÜSİAD 2005: 96). In fact, this meant that once Turkey was defined as a country
of Islamic civilization, some values imposed as EU accession conditionality might not be
considered  ‘correct  and  just’  for  Turkish  Muslims  and  hence  could  be  legitimately
rejected on the basis of a civilizational divergence thesis. Likewise, MÜSİAD started to
explain disagreements produced within the negotiation process between Turkey and
the EU by ‘the  complex and profound historical,  cultural  and religious  divergences
between the two camps’ (Bolat’s 2006 speech in Bolat 2007: 182).
54 The  new  international  context  provided  MÜSİAD  with  a  legitimate  background  to
challenge both the EU and the Turkish state regarding Islam-related issues within the
Europeanization  framework.  On  the  one  hand,  the  association  mobilized  Islamic
rhetoric to criticize the EU on the basis of universality of human rights and liberties, of
exercising increasingly assimilationist policies towards Muslim minorities since 9/11
(MÜSİAD 2005), and of not impartially defending human rights in Turkey by favoring
non-Muslims  and  Alevites  while  ignoring  conservative  Muslims’  needs  and
expectations about the freedoms of expression, conscience and religion (MÜSİAD 2005:
98). Furthermore, the Muslim minority policies of EU member states such as Germany
and France were challenged for not respecting the EU’s own discourse of pluralism
(Bolat’s 2006 speech in Bolat 2007: 194).
55 On the other hand, the Turkish secular republican polity was accused to be ‘desiring an
autocratic  EU  that  turns  a  blind  eye  to  the  democratic  and  Islamic  sensibilities  of
Turkish society’ (Bolat’s 2004 speech in Bolat 2007: 69). MÜSİAD interpreted constraints
on  religious  freedoms  as  obstacles  to  Turkey’s  democracy.  It  adopted  the
Europeanization  process  as  the  new  background  to  problematize  some  religiously
significant issues such as the headscarf ban in universities and public institutions, the
lack  of  facilities  in  favor  of  religious  practices  such  as  worship  places  and  meal
arrangements  according  to  Ramadan  rituals  and  to  Friday  prayer  in workplaces
(MÜSİAD 2005: 98); religious people’s demands to give further religious education to
their children (MÜSİAD 2006), and the fact that vocational school graduates, including
religious  ones,  were  not  equally  graded  as  conventional  schools  graduates  in  the
university entrance exams (MÜSİAD 2007b).
56 I  qualify  these  political  challenges  expressed  in  an  Islamic  rhetoric  as  Islamic
Euroscepticism because it expresses a skepticism about the EU’s impartiality towards
Muslim-related issues and they are addressed both to the EU and to the Turkish state to
express skepticism that Islam-related issues are not fairly dealt with, along any other
social  or  cultural  identity  claims,  within  the  Europeanization  conditionality  on
democratization.
57 Furthermore, this Islamic rhetoric was not mobilized to refute Turkey’s integration to
EU. Hence, it does not indicate a change in MÜSİAD’s political stance favoring Turkey’s
Europeanization. It  thrives alongside a pro-EU attitude in the form of a progressive
interest  in  EU  related  issues,  its  eager  support  for  the  legislative  harmonization
process,  its  continuing  economic  orientation  toward  European  markets  and  the
adoption  of  European  business  culture,  as  well  as  the  Europeanization  of
representational strategies and activities as we mentioned earlier in the paper. Similar
to AKP’s political discourse, MÜSİAD urged that the EU conditionalities be internalized
as ‘Ankara criteria’  for the sake of  Turkish society with or without the prospect of
eventual  membership  (MÜSİAD  2007a:  91;  MÜSİAD  2008:  181).  The  EU,  as  a  supra-
national  structure,  is  heavily  integrated  in  the  way  the  association  rethinks  the
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international  system:  MÜSİAD  takes  the  EU  as  ‘the  model  par  excellence to  fight
underdevelopment and inter-state conflicts’ and recommends the Europeanization of
relations between Afro-Eurasian states in order to create a common space of economic
and political cooperation (Bolat’s 2004 speech in Bolat 2007: 48-49).
58 The  creation  of  an  Islamic  Euroscepticism  indicates  that  the  pragmatic  and
opportunistic political Europeanization of MÜSİAD is on its way to becoming a societal
Europeanization. This societal Europeanization is an interactive process of collective
identity  and  meaning  construction  along  European  formal  or  informal  norms  by
domestic actors within the European integration framework. We have observed that
the  social  learning  aspect  of  societal  Europeanization  in  the  economic  sphere  had
started as a result of socialization into European business spaces. European business
norms  and  principals  are  internalized  as  constitutive  beliefs  about  good  economic
governance and individual economic success.
59 Creative usages account for another aspect of societal Europeanization: they concern
the  intersubjective  meanings  that  an  actor  attaches  to  the  EU  and  this  actor’s  re-
evaluation of the European integration process in relation to its positions on certain
national issues as well as larger international phenomena and his reinterpretations of
the national and international developments in the Europeanization context. The EU
and Europe become increasingly a reference point in the construction of social and
political  identity  of  the  religious  social  group  that  MÜSİAD  represents.  Adopting
European norms and principles such as human rights and democracy as the basis for
religious freedom claims not only for religious Muslims in Turkey but for European
Muslims as well demonstrates that this Islamic Euroscepticism is a product of creative
usage of Europeanization inherent in the very process itself.
60 These  creative  usages  are  strongly  embedded  in  national  contexts  and  actors’
perceptions of  national and international phenomena.  In our case,  Muslims both in
Turkey and Europe are redefined as a having a collective identity and common right to
proclaim their cultural difference within the Europeanization process. Moreover, the
MÜSİAD case teaches us that the trajectory along which social actors make creative use
of  European integration pursues  a  multiple-dependencies  path.  These  dependencies
concern the policy preferences, political goals, and resources of the social actor; the
EU-related changes in domestic politics; international developments; the level political
actors’ socialization within European spaces; and the evolution of the EU integration
process.
61 Social actors play an active and determinant role in the reception of Europeanization
norms in domestic politics (Bomber & Peterson 2000; Carter & Pasquier 2006 cited in
Baisnée & Pasquier 2007: 26). The actor adjusts its attitude towards EU integration and
related issues according to the probable perceived impacts of these variables on its
ability to achieve goals, to complete tasks, and to benefit from resources and to provide
new  ones.  Knowing  that  all  of  the  mentioned  variables  are  interlinked,  these
dependencies  are  reinterpreted by the  actors  in  this  very  process  with the  goal  of
maintaining their political relevance and empowering their positions in the national
power structure as well as acquiring recognition at the European level. Hence, Islamic
Euroscepticism gives a visibility and a political voice to Islamic groups and recognition
to their religious claims within the Europeanization process itself.
62 The more these creative identity and meaning constructions resonate with ideas about
the nation and political order, the more likely they are to be incorporated into these
The Europeanization of MÜSİAD: Political opportunism, Economic Europeanizatio...
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 9 | 2009
15
identities  in  public  opinion  (Risse  2001:  202;  Waever  1998,  2004).  Since  Islam  is
repeatedly referred to regarding Turkish EU membership prospects in the post-9/11
world,  Islamic  Euroscepticism  is  increasingly  gaining  ground  not  only  among
Europeanized Islamic groups but throughout the whole of Turkish society in the course
of its Europeanization process.
 
Conclusion
63 In  this  paper,  Europeanization  is  analyzed  through  the  evolution  of  MÜSİAD’s
socialization  in  European  contexts,  its  attitude  vis-à-vis  Turkey’s  EU  membership
prospects, and its policy claim-making concerning Turkey’s domestic issues and foreign
policy  formulations.  This  process  was  examined  in  a  temporal  causal  sequence  in
relation to the economic integration of SMEs into European markets, the evolution of
Turkey’s membership process, and larger international developments. I demonstrated
that  since  1999,  Turkish  process  of  European  integration  has  progressively  been
integrated into MÜSİAD’s  policy preferences on domestic  and foreign issues,  its  re-
evaluation of business culture and economic strategies at both the macro and micro
levels, and finally its patterns of redefining collective identities.
64 I  studied  MÜSİAD’s  Europeanization  process  in  two  interrelated  but  not  fully
converging  spheres  of  economic  and  political  Europeanization.  Firstly,  concerning
economic  Europeanization,  increasing  business  contacts  with  European  partners,
participation in international business sector expositions and MÜSİAD-organized visits
to  European  countries  generate  a  process  of  social  learning  about  the  economic
functioning and governance in EU countries,  European business ethics,  and culture.
Growing trade activity within European markets leads to the appraisal and adoption of
European business patterns, manufacturing mechanisms, and quality standards. These
patterns and standards become intrinsic elements of the evaluation of their own and of
others’ business identities and practices. The international socialization process does
not  only  lead to  societal  learning at  the  individual  level  but  also  to  a  professional
Europeanization at the institutional level thanks to MÜSİAD’s inclusion in European
SME  networks.  In  this  process, MÜSİAD  acts  as  a  spillover  agent  of  economic
Europeanization within the SME sector for its members in particular and in Turkey in
general. Furthermore, at the international level, it acts as a transmitter of European
economic norms and standards to non-European markets through its members’ trade
relations  and  their  participation  in  international  platforms  in  the  Eurasia  region,
especially among the Muslim countries.
65 Regarding  the  political  aspect,  MÜSİAD’s  political  Europeanization  was  intended  to
pursue a more complex multiple-dependencies path. The EU’s attitudes towards Turkey
and issues  stressed in  the  reform process  led  to  changes  in  MÜSİAD’s  approach to
Turkey’s membership in the EU and related issues from hard to soft Euroscepticism. Its
Islamic  orientation  proved  to  be  significant  concerning  the  political  aspects  of  the
association’s  attitude  towards  Turkey’s  EU  integration.  Even  though,  as  a  business
association, it admitted the need to comply with EU economic legislation earlier than
political agents of the Islamic movement, like the latter, MÜSİAD acted as a political
opportunist to benefit from EU democratization pre-accession conditionalities in the
form of  liberalizing civil  society and establishing civilian control  over  the military.
Similarly, its Islamic orientation led it to politicize religiously significant issues in the
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democratization process and to give Islamic responses to both the EU’s and the Turkish
state’s promotion of secularism.
66 However, the special characteristic of MÜSİAD within this process lies in the fact that,
as a voluntary business association, it is neither bound by electoral turn-over periods
nor  politically  responsible  for  the  governance  of  Turkey’s  institutional  integration
process  with  regard  to  EU  authorities,  as  is  the  case  with  political  parties.  This
relatively independent position from a political party’s constraints provides an NGO, in
an ongoing  integration  process,  with  a  greater  opportunity  to  be  critical  of  the
integration process and to make more creative use of Europeanization based on the
demands and interests of its membership base and with the aim to enhance its position
with  respect  to  other  NGOs.  As  such,  on  the  one  hand,  MÜSİAD’s  economic
Europeanization encouraged it to adopt eager pro-European policy preferences and a
more European style of policy making in economic governance than the other Islamic
groups. On the other hand, its Islamically-oriented institutional identity distinguished
it  from other  business  associations  by  compelling  it  to  emphasize  the  cultural  and
religious aspects of the religiously conservative social group it represents with regard
to the Europeanization debates. Moreover, it could more deliberately make creative use
of Europeanization and more expressively mobilize an Islamic rhetoric to criticize the
EU and the secular Turkish state regarding religious issues than the AKP, which was
bound by electoral and political concerns.
67 I  aim to  contribute  to  the  literatures  on  Turkish  NGOs  and  Islamic  movements  by
demostrating the creative use of  Europeanization by a religiously oriented business
association  and  the  novel  ways  it  mobilized  Islamic  rhetoric  to  express  its
Euroscepticism.  Unlike  the  categorical  Islamist  opposition  to  Europe  based  on  the
civilizational divergence thesis of the early 1990s, this new form of Islamic rhetoric
does not resist Europeanization. On the contrary, it is a product of the internalization
of this very process and it accompanies Europeanization, if not motivating it. This new
Islamic rhetoric expresses a soft skepticism about the EU’s approach to certain issues of
religious significance in Turkey as well as addressing the Muslim migrants’ conditions
in European countries.
68 The coexistence of Islamic Euroscepticism with a pro-European attitude reveals that
Europeanization  became an  integral  element  in  the  ways  that  Islamic  social  actors
perceive,  define,  and  criticize  European  integration,  capitalizing  on  the  material,
political and symbolic resources provided by the very process itself. However, it is to be
seen whether the impact of Europeanization is exclusively limited to Islamically and
economically relevant issues or if  it is a more comprehensive transformation in the
sense of engendering a pro-active pluralism towards other groups’ rights and liberties
as well.
69 This  analysis  of  a  case  of  Turkish  Europeanization  from  the  perspective  of  an
Islamically-oriented actor contributes to the literature on Euroscepticism by showing
that Euroscepticism is not only national-interest and policy bounded. The religious and
cultural otherness paradigm in which Turkey’s accession process is problematized as
well  as  the  Islamic  orientation  of  MÜSİAD  proved  to  be  determining  factors  in
pioneering a novel  and creative usage of  the Europeanization process in building a
third kind of Euroscepticism in an Islamic form. Furthermore, unlike national-interest
and policy Euroscepticism that concerns domestic issues of EU member or candidate
countries,  Islamic  Euroscepticism  not  only  expresses  criticism  and  claims  about
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religious issues  in  Turkey and the way they are dealt  with within the membership
process but also has a larger scope in dealing with Islam-related issues on a global scale.
As herein demonstrated, Islamic rhetoric is mobilized to attract attention to the way
the EU deals with Islam as a religion as well as to the problems of European Muslims.
70 Yet,  this  analysis  of  Islamic  Euroscepticism  points  out  two  risks.  First,  Islamic
Euroscepticism endangers  a  full-fledged support  for  Turkey’s  total  compliance with
universally accepted secular values and norms by demanding special arrangements in
the name of Islamic cultural and religious particularities of Turkish society. Second, the
Islamic rhetoric, by demarking the religious differences with bold lines, reproduces the
clash of civilizations thesis that the symbolic meaning attributed to Turkey’s European
integration aimed to eliminate in the first place.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
AB Haber (2005) ‘MÜSİAD’s Evaluation and Propositions about EU Negotiation Process’,
04.03.2005, URL: http://www.abhaber.com/haber.php?id=4281
Alkan, Haluk (1998) ‘Türkiye’de İşadamları Örgütleri ve Devlet’, Birikim 114, pp. 43-62.
Alkan, Haluk; Ugur, Aydin (2000) ‘Türkiye’de İşadamı Devlet İlişkiler Perspektifinden MÜSİAD’,
Toplum ve Bilim 85, pp. 133-155.
Atan, Serap (2004) ‘Europeanization of Turkey Peak Business Organisations and Turkey-EU
relations’, in Uğur, Mehmet; Canefe, Nergis (eds.), Turkey and European Integration: Accession
Prospects and Issues, London, New York, Routledge, pp.100-121.
Baisnée, Olivier; Pasquier, Romain (2007) L’Europe telle qu’elle se fait : Européanisation et sociétés
politiques nationales, Paris, CNRS Editions.
Bayramoglu, Ali; Genel Baskandan [From The President],Cerceve 29, pp.1. 
Beichelt, Timm (2008) ‘Dimensions of Europeanization’, in Bafoil, François; Timm Biechelt (eds.), 
L’Européanisation d’Ouest en Est, Paris, Harmattan, pp. 31-53.
Bolat, Ömer (2007) Medeniyet Ideali [The Ideal of Civilization], İstanbul, Küre.
Börzel, Tanja A.; Risse, Thomas (2000) ‘When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic
Change’, European Integration Online Papers (EIoP) 4 (15), URL: http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/
2000-015a.htm.
Buğra, Ayşe (1998) ‘Class, Culture, and State: An Analysis of Interest Representation by Two
Turkish Business Associations’, International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 30, pp. 521-539.
Buğra, Ayşe (2002) ‘Labor, Capital, and Religion: Harmony and Conflict among the Constituency
of Political Islam in Turkey’, Middle Eastern Studies 2 (38), pp. 187-204.
Buğra, Ayşe (1999) Islam in Economic Organizations, Istanbul, TESEV.
Çarkoğlu, Ali (2003), ‘Who Wants Full Membership? Characteristics of Turkish Public Support for
EU Membership’, Turkish Studies 4 (1), pp. 171-194.
The Europeanization of MÜSİAD: Political opportunism, Economic Europeanizatio...
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 9 | 2009
18
Diez, Thomas; Agnantopoulos, Apostolos; Kaliber, Alper (2005) ‘File: Turkey, Europeanization and
Civil Society’, South European Society and Politics 10 (1), pp. 1-15.
Duran, Burhanettin (2006) ‘JDP and Foreign Policy as an Agent of Transformation’, in Yavuz,
Hakan. (eds.), The Emergence of New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Party, Salt Lake City, University of
Utah Press, pp. 281-305.
EU Commission (2000) Regular Progress Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession, Brussels.
EU Commission (2001) Regular Progress Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession, SEC (2001),
1756, Brussels.
EU Commission (2002) Regular Progress Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession, SEC (2002)
1412, Brussels.
European Council (2001) European Council Meeting, SN 300/1/01 REV 1, Laeken.
European Council (2005) European Council Meeting-16/17.12.2004, 16238/1/04 REV 1, Brussels.
Haverland, Markus (2006) ‘Does the EU Cause Domestic Development? Improving Case Selection
in Europeanization Research’, West European Politics 29 (1), pp. 134-146.
Jacquot, Sophie; Woll, Cornelia (2003) ‘Usage of European Integration – Europeanization from a
Sociological Perspective’ European Integration Online Papers (EIoP), 7 (12), URL: http://eiop.or.at/
eiop/texte/2003-012a.htm
Keyman, Fuat; Koyuncu, Berrin (2004) ‘AKP, MÜSİAD, Ekonomik Kalkınma ve Modernite’, Dusunen
Siyaset 19, pp. 125-145.
Kıvanç, Ümit (1997) ‘İslamcılar & Para-Pul: Bir Dönüsüm Hikayesi’, Birikim 99, pp. 39-58.
Menderes, Çınar (2005) Siyasal Bir Sorun Olarak İslamcılık, Istanbul, Dipnot.
MÜSİAD (1996a) Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan’s Visit to East Asia and MÜSİAD’s Visit to Bosnia-
Herzegovina (18), Istanbul.
MÜSİAD (1996b) Cotton Union (19), Istanbul.
MÜSİAD (1998) The EU Export Standards and Turkey’s Compliance (31), Istanbul.
MÜSİAD (1999) Turkish Economy 1999 (35).
MÜSİAD (2000) Turkish Economy 2000 (36).
MÜSİAD (2001) Turkish Economy 2001 (38).
MÜSİAD (2002) Turkish Economy 2002 (39).
MÜSİAD (2003a) Public Declaration, Bas.Kom. 05-255, 15.03.2003.
MÜSİAD (2003b) Public Declaration, Bas.Kom. 05-256, 20.03.2003.
MÜSİAD (2003c) AB Sorusturmasi [EU Interrogation], Cerceve 29, pp. 70-78.
MÜSİAD (2003d) Turkish Economy 2003 (40).
MÜSİAD (2005) The Evaluation of Turkish Economy 2004 and the first half of 2005 (48).
MÜSİAD (2006) Public Declaration, Bas.Kom., 09.11.2006.
MÜSİAD (2007a) Turkish Economy 2007 (51).
MÜSİAD (2007b) Public Declaration, Bas. Kom., 07.11.2007.
MÜSİAD (2008) Turkish Economy 2008 (56).
The Europeanization of MÜSİAD: Political opportunism, Economic Europeanizatio...
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 9 | 2009
19
Öniş, Ziya (1997) ‘The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: the rise of the Welfare
Party in perspective’, Third World Quarterly 18 (4), pp. 743-766.
Öniş, Ziya (2001) ‘Political Islam at the Crossroads: From Hegemony to Coexistence’, Contemporary
Politics 7 (4), 2001.
Öniş, Ziya; Türem, Umut (2001) ‘Business, Globalisation and Democracy: A Comparative Analysis
of Turkish Business Associations’, Turkish Studies 2 (2), pp. 94-120.
Öniş, Ziya (2003) ‘Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey-EU
Relations in the post-Helsinki Era’, Turkish Studies 4, pp. 9-34.
Radaelli, Claudio (2004) ‘Europeanisation: Solution or Problem?’, European Integration Online Papers
(EIoP) 8 (16), URL: http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-016a.htm
Taggart, Paul (1998) ‘A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western
European Party Systems’, European Journal of Political Research 33, pp. 363-388.
Taggart, Paul; Szczerbiak, Aleks (2001) ‘Parties, Positions and Europe: Euroscepticism in EU
Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe’, SEI Working Papers no 46 (also Opposing Europe
Research Working Paper no 2) Sussex, Sussex European Institute.
Taggart, Paul; Szczerbiak, Aleks (2002) ‘The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and
Candidate States’, SEI Working Paper No 51 (also Opposing Europe Research Network Working
Paper No 6) Sussex, Sussex European Institute.
Thatcher, Mark (2004) ‘Winners and Losers in Europeanization: Reforming the National
Regulation of Telecommunications’, West European Politics 27 (2), pp. 284-309.
Tocci, Nathalie (2005) ‘Europeanization in Turkey: Trigger or Anchor for Reform?’, South European
Society and Politics 10 (1), pp. 73-83.
Uğur, Mehmet (2003) ‘Testing Times in EU-Turkey Relations: the Road to Copenhagen and
Beyond’, Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans 5 (2), pp. 165-183.
Uğur, Mehmet (2005) ‘Europeanization of Turkish Economic Policy: The Advantages of Tying
One’s Hands’, paper presented at the Conference Europeanization and Transformation: Turkey in the
Post-Helsinki Era, Koc University, 2-3 December 2005, Istanbul.
Uğur, Mehmet; Yankaya, Dilek (2008) ‘Policy Entrepreneurship, Policy Opportunism and EU
Conditionality: The AKP and TÜSİAD Experience in Turkey’, Governance 21 (4), pp. 581-601.
Visier, Claire; Polo, Jean-François (2005) ‘Les groupes d’intérêt turcs auprès des institutions
européennes : une intégration bruxelloise’, CAIRN, 23 (2), pp. 9-24.
Weber, Andy (2006) ‘Relations Between the State and Civil Society in Turkey: Does the EU Make a
Difference?’ in Joseph, Joseph S. (eds) Turkey and The European Union, Internal Dynamics and External
Challenges, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 83-95.
Wilts, Arnold (2002) ‘Strategies of Business Interest Associations in The Netherlands and
Germany: European Priorities or Domestic Concerns?’, Politique Européenne (7), pp. 96-115.
Yarar, Erol (1994) New Perspectives to the World on the Eve of the 21st Century, Istanbul, MÜSİAD.
Yavuz, Hakan (2006) The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti, Salt Lake City,
University of Utah Press.
The Europeanization of MÜSİAD: Political opportunism, Economic Europeanizatio...
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 9 | 2009
20
ABSTRACTS
This  article  examines  MÜSİAD’s  economic  and  political  Europeanization  from  1994  to  2008.
Europeanization is demonstrated to be an interactive process generating changes in a domestic
actor’s policy preferences, styles, resources, and discourses. MÜSİAD’s Europeanization is then
shown to be part of a social learning process resulting from its members’ exposure to European
business  practices  and culture.  Furthermore,  Turkey’s  EU accession process  led to a  creative
adoption of European norms and their reinterpretation with regard to the association’s concerns
about religious issues,  giving birth to an Islamic rhetoric  expressing criticism of  the EU and
challenging  the  Turkish  secular  regime’s  policies  towards  religiously  conservative  demands.
However,  this  Islamic  Euroscepticism  not  only  jeopardizes  MÜSİAD’s  support  for  Turkey’s
complete compliance with secular universal norms but also reproduces the clash of civilizations
thesis that Turkey’s accession project to the EU initially aimed to obliterate.
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